Some analysts have likened the current competition between China and the United States to a game of chess. It’s really more like the two countries are playing a dozen simultaneous games. One of those contests is being played on an artificial intelligence (AI) game board. Like chess, the board is filled with many pieces. Games of chess generally end when one of the competitors achieves checkmate. There are rare occasions, however, when a game ends in stalemate. That is likely how the ongoing rivalry between the United States and China in the area of artificial intelligence (AI) will end. Neither side will ever achieve checkmate.

That doesn’t mean the competition isn’t heated or important. Journalist Jason Hiner observes, “Powerful AI models have … risen to the level of national security concerns.”[1] Chinese expert Ryan Hass explains, “The two sides are in a battle for AI dominance, with the winner gaining enduring economic and geopolitical advantages over the other.”[2] Hass cites former National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan who believes the stakes of the U.S-China tech competition are so dramatic that the United States must implement unconditional export controls to try to throttle China’s advancements in foundational technologies to “maintain as large a lead as possible” over China.

The Many Pieces on the AI Game Board

There are many pieces at play in the global AI contest between the U.S. and China and how those pieces are moved on the game board remains in constant flux. Below are brief discussions about a few of those game pieces.

• Computer Chips. Analysts from the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) report, “The U.S. government and those of its allies have imposed and progressively tightened controls on the export of semiconductor technology, devices, and tools to China in an effort to maintain U.S. leadership in this critical sector.”[3] They add, “Preventing China from acquiring the most advanced chip technology makes sense from a national security perspective, but export restrictions alone cannot substitute for comprehensive industrial and research policy measures necessary to ensure U.S. leadership in semiconductor design, production, and infrastructure.”

• Foundational Models. Journalist Jose Antonio Lanz reports, “The U.S. used its AI kill switch in June [2026]. China appears to be building one for July. Beijing has spent the past month in quiet talks with its biggest AI companies about restricting who gets to use them. … Chinese authorities held meetings with Alibaba, ByteDance, and startup Z.ai about potentially limiting overseas access to China's most advanced AI models — including those not yet released.”[4] Journalists Raffaele Huang and Tina Li explain why that’s a problem. They write, “American companies have a new AI addiction: cheaper Chinese models. But as the race for artificial-intelligence supremacy heats up, Beijing is considering tightening its grip on homegrown technology.”[5]

• Other Hardware and Software. Alicia García-Herrero and Bertin Martens, Senior Fellows at Bruegel, report, “Despite Chinese progress, the United States remains for now ahead in the race for dominance over the so-called artificial intelligence hardware stack — the resources and equipment, especially semiconductors, needed to run AI models. US multinational Nvidia is the global market leader with the best-performing AI chips. It accounts for roughly half the world’s installed AI chip stock but as much as two thirds of installed computing capacity.”[6] They believe, however, that China will rapidly close both the hardware and software gap that currently exists. They conclude, “The early evidence suggests that the software gap, like the hardware gap, is no longer fixed or unbridgeable.”

• AI Usage. There are two areas where China has a lead: disinformation and interference. Policy expert Diana Fu explains, “The United States is arguably more susceptible to foreign interference from the People’s Republic of China and other foreign actors than perhaps ever in its history. This is due to a two-pronged effect. One prong is the leveraging of artificial intelligence as foreign powers go on the ‘offensive’ to drive wedges into the U.S. voter base. … Another prong is the United States’ castration of its own defense mechanisms, coupled with a rolling back of regulatory oversight over private companies’ AI innovation. This vulnerability comes in part from the undermining of institutions whose very mandates are to guard against foreign interference.”[7]

Is There a Sensible Way Ahead

Policy expert Patricia M. Kim writes, “As with nuclear weapons during the Cold War — when the fear of catastrophic escalation drove the United States and the Soviet Union to avoid direct confrontation and eventually pursue arms control — a similar dynamic could emerge around AI. For instance, in a rare moment of alignment in November 2024, Washington and Beijing publicly pledged to exclude AI from nuclear command and control systems. Implementation and verification will, of course, matter far more than rhetoric. But the underlying reality remains: both powers have too much at stake to risk an uncontrollable AI-driven escalation.”[8]

Mark MacCarthy, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University, believes the current policy path could be harmful for both the U.S. and China. He writes, “If the US thinks Chinese systems are unsafe, leading to cybersecurity threats, dangerous bioweapons or a loss of human control, the US won’t allow access to them and US consumers and companies will be worse off. And similar security concerns will push China toward a ban of US AI models, even for research and development purposes.”[9] Like Kim, he believes policymakers must look for some sensible ways to move forward. He explains that policymakers have two options to choose from: “An explicit protectionist policy for US AI models, leading to a hard-to-secure and even harder-to-enforce global boycott of Chinese AI models, versus a cooperative strategy of reducing AI risks for all providers of AI models, allowing global AI competition on the merits.”

Concluding Thoughts

Hass concludes, “Rather than obsessing over which country is in the lead and what more the United States can do to slow China’s progress, U.S. policymakers must quickly gain comfort with the fact that America and China are going to be navigating the frontiers of AI side-by-side over the coming years. Neither side likely will gain a decisive edge over the other.” Since that is the case, McCarthy and Kim both suggest the U.S. and China looks for ways to cooperate. McCarthy concludes, “The AI dialogue could be a step back from the brink of all-out battle for AI supremacy, with the US and China both choosing the path of safety and cooperation, not security and confrontation.” Kim concludes that both countries should be concerned about foundational AI models getting into the wrong hands. She explains, “While the AI rivalry between the United States and China is real and consequential, it should not be the only concern in both capitals. The future of global security will not be determined solely by which power leads in AI innovation — but by whether those innovations can be kept out of the hands of those most willing to use them irresponsibly.” That sounds like a good place for the AI dialogue to begin.

Footnotes

[1] Jason Hiner, “AI is now a key chess piece in US-China relations,” The Deep View, 8 July 2026.

[2] R. David Edelman, Diana Fu, Ryan Hass, Patricia M. Kim, Ying Lin, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Melanie W. Sisson, and Nicol Turner Lee, “How will AI influence US-China relations in the next 5 years?” The Brookings Institution, 18 June 2025.

[3] Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell, “The Limits of Chip Export Controls in Meeting the China Challenge,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 14 April 2025.

[4] Jose Antonio Lanz, “China May Be Following US Lead With Quiet Crackdown on AI Exports,” Yahoo News, 7 July 2026.

[5] Raffaele Huang and Tina Li, “China Weighs Limits on the AI Models American Companies Love,” The Wall Street Journal, 9 July 2026.

[6] Alicia García-Herrero and Bertin Martens, “Stack battles: the US-China artificial-intelligence rivalry is moving beyond chips alone,” Bruegel, 22 June 2026.

[7] Op. Cit., Edelman et al.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Mark MacCarthy, “How the US and China Can Step Back from the Battle for AI Model Supremacy,” Tech Policy Press, 14 July 2026.